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25 November 1947

DRAFT MEMORANDUM:**SUBJECT:** Mobilization for Psychological Warfare

1. Two related and pressing problems require consideration by the Subcommittees for Special Studies and Evaluations. One is to determine the detailed structure and composition of the National Wartime Psychological Warfare Organization. The other is to determine the necessary actions and the timing and sequence of such actions required to create such an organization when directed.

2. It may be assumed now that, in principle at least, ~~SMCC~~ 304/6 will be approved. It must be assumed that regardless of the terms of reference of existing agencies there will always be insufficient time for mobilization and as a result, regardless of the urgency, the establishment of such an organization will be accomplished by a process of growth. The uncertainty that exists as to the predictability of M-Day, especially in relation to D-Day, does not, however, preclude the achievement of a considerable measure of preparedness by departmental actions planned, coordinated and executed in time. It must also be assumed that peacetime psychological measures which are being conducted by State Department's OIE, Army Department's R & D and other agencies, including possibly some Black operations under the auspices of CIA, will be intensified in proportion as threat of an emergency becomes apparent. It cannot be assumed that these agencies provide a nucleus for the establishment of a National Psychological Warfare Organization.

3. The detailed analysis of the wartime organization now under way should provide the following:

- a. A clear delineation of responsibilities between all concerned.
- b. A workable definition of command, control and liaison relationships.
- c. An overall estimate requirements in personnel specialized skills, equipment and communications.

Concurrently with the above, it should be possible to prepare a tentative mobilization plan. Such a plan cannot be finalized until the ultimate organization is, more or less, completely firmed up. There are, however, certain obvious steps to be taken which in rough outline might include the following:

- a. Acceptance of a strategic concept for our psychological operations in time of war which would serve as a guide for future planning.

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- b. Preparation of estimates of the situation covering the phased time periods which would indicate the basis for a plan for planning.
- c. Summation and allocation of intelligence requirements for planning purposes.
- d. Determination of training requirements and initiation of training programs within each department.
- e. Estimation of personnel requirements in a broad way and providing for these requirements in the personnel procurement planning of each department.
- f. Estimation of logistic requirements and providing for their inclusion in the supply planning of the departments.
- g. Integration of psychological warfare planning with military planning for war.
- h. A balanced and adequate research and development effort.

4. It may be remarked that the above outline stresses planning responsibilities of considerable magnitude. The members of the Subcommittee have long recognized that as a subcommittee we are not sufficiently staffed to discharge these responsibilities. By the same token, the responsibilities, as yet undefined, which must be accounted for during transition period between peace and war cannot adequately be discharged except by virtue of prior preparation in each of the departments. It would seem to me, therefore, that our principal job at the moment, in the absence of any existing executive agency which might have served as a nucleus for mobilization, is to create an awareness in each of our departments as to the nature and extent of departmental responsibilities. We must prepare directives to accomplish the actions we have outlined and within our respective departments prepare coordinated staff actions which will put these directives into effect. Thereafter, for as long as the Subcommittee remains primarily responsible for coordinating the implementation of psychological warfare plans and policies, we should establish ourselves as the principal agency monitoring the state of preparedness of each department in this field.

5. The foregoing is offered as a tentative approach to the problem which might be undertaken concurrently with the task of determining in detail the wartime organization.